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Abstract 
This article argues that the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) cannot 
be studied without taking into account the realpolitik ambitions of Russia in the ‘Near Abroad’. 
The European Union (EU) was rather optimistic in the post-Cold War period because it 
experienced a full transformation of the world order. The new political order facilitated the 
democratisation process of a number of Central and Eastern European countries. It turned out, 
however, that the optimism of 1990’s and early 2000’s cannot be translated in the ENP for 
several reasons. Russia’s assertive foreign policy is a serious impediment vis-à-vis the 
democratisation efforts of the EU since the former weakens the statehood of Ukraine and thus 
makes it nearly impossible to implement democratic reforms. Therefore, this article defines the 
ENP as a “friendly policy” meaning that it is able to induce changes provided that the 
neighbourhood is more or less peaceful and there is no third party which would use its hard 
power to prevent the objectives of the ENP. 
Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy; theories of international relations; 
democratisation; Ukraine; Russia. 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2003 European Security Strategy was full of confidence. The document stated that “Europe 
has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th 
Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history” 
(European Council, 2003: 1). It is a common sense to say that “time has changed” but it is 
perhaps true: time has really changed. It is interesting to see how Europe and its international 
relations have changed over the past two decades. In the 1990’s, full of hopes: the former 
member of the Soviet Union will become member of the European Union (EU). In the early 
2000’s, still some hope: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have also the chance to 
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transform the new neighbours. In the late 2000’s: the ENP is failing. In November 2013: the 
ENP failed. With the buzzwords of the ENP, the evolution can be described from “ring of 
friends” to “ring of fire”. 
While enlargement policy has been clearly one of the most successful foreign policy instruments 
of the EU, the ENP has not been capable of radically transforming the political and economic 
systems of the partner countries. The problems are manifold: the lack of membership 
perspective, the absence of massive financial incentives, the hesitant behaviour of the targeted 
governments behaviour vis-à-vis European integration, the disinterest of some EU member 
states concerning the future of some ENP countries, etc. all make it very difficult to draw these 
countries closer to the EU. The literature has been also very successful in showing how these 
factors inhibit the effectiveness of the ENP. 
Nonetheless, this article argues that there is a component which has been mainly missing from 
the literature of the ENP: Russia’s realpolitik ambitions in Ukraine (and perhaps in other Eastern 
European states as well). The impact of Russian foreign policy on Ukraine has not been 
completely neglected, however, it was studied from the perspective of interdependence 
(Dimitrova – Dragneva, 2009; Lavenex – Schimmelfennig, 2009) or the clash of integration 
process painting a “tug-of-war” picture between the EU and Russia (Casier, 2007). Nevertheless, 
with the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, it became clear that 
Russia’s ambitions are much more than attempts to draw Ukraine economically closer to itself. 
The case of Ukraine demonstrates the return of realpolitik which, in turn, has clear implications 
on the democratisation outlook of the country. 
In order to show how Russia affects the democratisation efforts of the EU, this article, first, is 
looking for the question of why the current literature of the theories of the ENP have excluded 
the realpolitik ambitions of certain states and argues that the optimism of the post-Cold War 
period has overshadowed the probability of blatant interventions in Europe. Instead of focusing 
on realpolitik, many analyses emphasized the impact of economic and financial incentives on 
partner countries.  Second, it presents the main changes in Russian foreign policy and claims that 
a careful analyse of Russia’s international interests has to be always part of any assessment which 
aims at examining the impact of the ENP on Eastern European countries. Third, it shows how 
the outlook of the ENP has changed given the new circumstances in Ukraine. It concludes that 
the ENP is a “friendly policy” which means that its objectives can only be achieved in a peaceful 
neighbourhood and cannot tackle the new realpolitik challenges in the neighbourhood. 
2. Optimism everywhere 
 
2.1 Optimism in international politics and brightness in Europe 
After witnessing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of policy-makers and scholars 
were optimist about the prospect of world politics. In his famous speech, George W. H. Bush 
realized that the Soviet leadership had changed its behaviour to a more cooperative approach vis-
à-vis the West and thought that Moscow would join the global economic and political system 
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dominated by the West. Seeing the changes in the international system, he even spoke about a 
“new world order” in which military confrontation would be ruled out. Peaceful negotiations 
would replace the old reflexes between states (Bush, 2009). The optimism about the world order 
had been reinforced by the fact that Boris Yeltsin and his liberal-minded foreign minister Andrei 
Kozyrev were open to adopt Western norms and values. They completely changed the discourse 
on the international order and called for the necessity of policy convergence in the world 
(Tsygankov, 2010). It seemed that the enthusiastic expectations of the early 1990s would be a 
reality in the post-Cold war period. 
The optimist political discourse was strengthened by scientific works as well, especially by the 
magnificent philosophical book written by Francis Fukuyama. His thesis is well-known around 
the world: liberal democracy is the “final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989: 2). He 
does not claim that liberal democracy lacks economic and social problems. However, he argues 
that the desire for recognition, which is a quintessential notion in his analysis, can only be 
achieved in liberal democracies. Pessimism, which dominated the 20th century, no longer holds 
for the second half of the century since “the world as a whole has not revealed new evils, but has 
gotten better in certain distinct ways” (Fukuyama, 1992: 12). According to Fukuyama, only liberal 
democracy survived in the end of 20th century from the different types of regimes. In other 
words, “there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge 
liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1992: 45). The premises of realism in international relations are 
“no longer fit the world” and they treat “a disease that no longer exists” (Fukuyama, 1992: 252-
253). 
Whether realist or liberal arguments are closer to any scholar, empirical data show that optimism 
cannot be fully neglected. In fact, recent developments in Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) clearly show that both the governments and people wanted to replace their 
old political and economic systems to liberal democracy and market economy. Not only Western 
Europe had been already building its peaceful and prosperous areas but also CEECs were also 
willing to join the club of Western countries. Nationalism and confrontation were replaced by 
cooperation between those states which had remarkable disagreements over the past decades. 
When national interest is determined by CEECs, it is never about territorial disputes anymore – 
which had been always part of the agenda in the recent centuries – but it is related to economic 
purposes. Never in the past two decades could one hear a prime minister or president in the 
CEECs talking about foreign policy adventures which would jeopardize other neighbouring 
nations. Hungary, for example, has even renamed its foreign ministry to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade indicating that the main purpose of foreign policy is to achieve economic 
objectives of the government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2011). 
The governments and the population of the CEECs hoped that transforming their states would 
fundamentally change the way how they had lived before. It is obvious that the freely elected 
governments and the population of the CEECs were willing to follow the model of the Western 
European states. By declaring that the main foreign policy priority is the “return to Europe”, the 
newly elected governments aimed at adopting the norms and values of liberal democracies. After 
decades of oppression, the population was also convinced that the only way their countries can 
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transform if they follow the Western modes of governance. The “soft power” of the EU was 
immense because every citizen located in the CEECs wanted to live like Austrians, Germans or 
French. 
Being the most important actor in encouraging changes in its neighbourhood, the EU was also 
sharing the optimism during the 1990’s. The example of Hungary and Poland boosted its 
confidence that not only these two states but others would be also able to follow the leading 
examples. The 1990’s clearly showed that the majority of the CEECs were keen to join the EU 
and would implement all the necessary reforms in order to become a member of the EU. Some 
countries performed better while others achieved the same objectives in a slower pace, but the 
overall picture was that the EU fostered the democratic consolidation of the CEECs. In 2004, a 
historical step in its existence, the EU had been enlarged with ten new members – mostly from 
Central and Eastern Europe – and later, Romania, Bulgaria and then Croatia also joined the 
community. Enlargement policy has been one of the most successful foreign policy instruments 
of the EU given that the membership perspective has always been the biggest incentive to 
aspirant countries. Meanwhile, the wish of strengthening relations between the enlarged EU and 
the new neighbours remained intact, however, it was also clear that the new political relations 
would not be based on the promise of accession. 
2.2 ENP: optimism in the darkness? 
The enlargement process and the idea of building closer relationship with the new 
neighbourhood proceeded in parallel in the early 2000’s. The ENP was designed by those who 
had worked previously on the enlargement policy (Kelley, 2006). This is one of the main reasons 
why optimism did not disappear after the 2000’s. While acknowledging the difficulties of 
transforming Eastern European states, it was widely believed that the EU can – sooner or later – 
achieve the same, or almost the same objectives which had been reached in CEECs. The idea of 
building closer relationship with the new neighbourhood was raised in 2002 by the European 
Commission and the High Representative (HR) Javier Solana. The General Affairs Council 
meeting, held in April 2002, welcomed the intention of the Commission and of the HR on the 
possibilities for establishing relations between the enlarged EU and its Eastern neighbours 
(Council of the European Union, 2002). 
The success of enlargement gave the EU further appetite to extend its rules and norms in its new 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. By establishing the ENP in 2003, the EU aimed at 
creating a “ring of friends” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003) which would 
gradually adopt its standards, norms and rules. While it is obvious that the EU has always been 
reluctant to give membership perspective to these countries, the ultimate aim has been to bring 
the neighbourhood as closer to the EU as possible both politically and economically. The EU 
was rather optimistic in achieving the same – or almost the same – objectives in the medium or 
long-term. This optimism was reflected in several policy documents and scholarly works. 
In his famous speech, Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, declared 
that that “The EU looks certain to remain a pole of attraction for its neighbours. For many of the 
countries in our future “backyard” the EU is the only prospect […] I want to see a “ring of 
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friends” surrounding the Union” (Prodi, 2002). Released in 2003, the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) can be also considered a rather optimistic policy document. It states that "Europe has 
never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th 
Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history” 
(European Council, 2003: 1). It further confirms that “We live in a world that holds brighter 
prospects but also greater threats than we have known” (European Council, 2003: 6). It is worth 
noting that the document enumerates a number of challenges but remains mainly positive on the 
status of the EU and its international relations. 
Wider Europe, the document which gave the framework to the ENP, reaffirmed that the “EU 
should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood with whom the EU 
enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003: 4). It takes into account that relations with Russia were not always easy but, if compared to 
Belarus, “the development of EU/Russia dialogue and cooperation on political and security 
issues, energy, environment and science and technology over the past few years accelerated 
rapidly” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 4-5). The Strategy Paper on the ENP 
reiterates the creation of four common spaces agreed at St Petersburg in May 2003. Given that 
the EU and Russia became close neighbour, the paper draws the attention to the need to work 
together on common concerns (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). 
In sum, the prospects were rather good in continuing the success of enlargement. It seemed that 
liberal democracy did not stop at the borders of Central European states but it could be fostered 
in Eastern Europe as well. Furthermore, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine showed that, apart 
from external actors, several internal factors also supported the idea of the possibility to create a 
more democratic and Western oriented countries in Eastern Europe as well. Viktor Yushchenko 
was not only the President of Ukraine but a symbol as well for the West that Ukraine may choose 
– for medium or longer term – the path of the European integration, or some of its form, despite 
having no membership perspective. 
2.3 Optimist ENP theories? 
Finding the optimist or “liberal” dimension of the ENP literature requires a much more 
sophisticated approach. Of course, there is no such thing that The theory of the ENP. The policy 
can be approached from theoretical several perspectives and studied from different angles. One 
of the most common approaches to examine the policy is to scrutinize how its main tool, 
political conditionality works. I argue that the theory of the effectiveness of political 
conditionality – both concerning the enlargement policy and the ENP – builds mainly on the 
theories of liberalism. They are liberal because they treat states which fundamentally seek to attain 
economic purposes. In other words, they simply assume that states are motivated by economic 
incentives and this is practically the only reason why they are moving closer or farther from the 
EU. They implicitly assume that democratisation depends basically on the size of the financial 
incentives available or, in other cases, the internal structure of a particular state may also 
determine its objectives which, in turn, is another liberal perspective. 
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A great number of studies – mainly elaborated by Frank Schimmelfennig and his collaborators – 
deal with the question of the effectiveness of political conditionality. These studies significantly 
contributed to our knowledge concerning the possibilities of EU foreign policy in the 
neighbourhood. It was argued that the efficacy of political conditionality depends on the possible 
domestic political costs payed by the candidate governments. Other factors – such as social 
influence or transnational mobilization – do not affect the decisions of the candidate countries 
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). 
In another study, three models of external governance are determined. Frist, external incentive 
model assumes that actors are “profit oriented” and adopt rules provided that the benefits exceed 
the domestic adoption costs. Second, the social learning model – just as in the case of grand 
theories – is an alternative to rationalist explanations which sees candidate countries capable if 
internalizing identities, norms and values and can be persuaded of the appropriateness of EU 
rules. Third, the lesson-drawing model assumes that states adopt the rules of the EU if those 
imply a solution to domestic problems. Similarly to the study written in 2003, the result is that 
external incentives model explains why CEECs adopt the rules and norms of the EU 
(Schimmelfennig – Sedelmeier, 2004). Studying specifically the ENP and creating a case study on 
Belarus, Schimmelfennig states that the outlook for the ENP is bad for three reasons: (1) the lack 
of major incentive (membership), (2) the threat of compromising the main purposes of the 
conditionality and (3) the adoption costs are too high (Schimmelfennig, 2005). 
In another study, Schimmelfennig argues that the effectiveness of political conditionality depends 
on three conditions: (1) the size of international rewards, (2) the size of domestic adoption costs, 
and (3) the credibility of political conditionality. He adds that authoritarian regime can impede the 
rule transfer. In Eastern Europe, he determines three more conditions as “long-term 
effectiveness”: countries with liberal, antiliberal and mixed party constellation. He finds that 
liberal parties facilitate the transformation. In the neighbourhood, the EU and NATO has “good 
chance of promoting democracy effectively – provided that reform – and Western-oriented 
political forces come to power” (Schimmelfennig, 2007: 136). 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz claims that “the impact of EU democracy promotion will be 
severely weakened where EU incentives are small – as is the case for those countries of the 
European neighbourhood that do not have a membership perspective” (Schimmelfennig – 
Scholtz, 2007: 5). They determine three mechanisms of democratisation. First, conditionality, 
second, modernization (implying that the more well a nation do, the greater probability it will 
have to builds its democracy), and third, linkage (implying that transnational factors affect the 
country concerned). They find that “the EU has successfully promoted democracy in its 
neighbourhood; that it owes its success to the use of political conditionality; and that the 
effectiveness of political conditionality depends on a credible perspective for the target countries 
of democracy promotion” (Schimmelfennig – Scholtz, 2007: 25). 
In sum, the main tool of the ENP has been implicitly approached from liberal perspectives. Of 
course, The theory of the ENP does not only include the effectiveness of political conditionality. 
Constructivists also contributed to the literature by declaring that the logic of appropriateness or 
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social learning determine (Börzel – Risse, 2000; Checkel 1999) the effectiveness of EU foreign 
policy. The governance perspective also shed light on the functioning of the ENP (Lavenex, 
2004; Lavenex – Schimmelfennig, 2009). However realists arguments have been clearly side-lined 
in the process of the building The theory of the ENP. In consequence, the theories did not take into 
account the possibility that a third actor – with its hard power – may impede the effectiveness of 
the rule transfer to Eastern European states. Multiple forms of leverage and influence, such as 
interdependence or coercive measures, have been appeared in the literature but the realpolitik 
ambitions have been mainly missing. 
3. A missed element? Analysing Russian foreign policy and its 
implications on the ENP 
Forgetting to write about Russia’s geopolitical interests has not been a fundamental mistake for a 
long time because the priorities of Russian foreign policy and the national interest has always 
been reconceptualised. Sometimes, Russia was more cooperative with Western states and decided 
to undertake the necessary reforms. Sometimes, it was more hostile and emphasized the unique 
Russian character and interests in the world. It should be emphasized that the evolution of 
Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period has not been linear. In other words, it cannot 
be said that Russian foreign policy changed from cooperative to hostile over the years. Instead, 
its behaviour vis-à-vis Western states has always fluctuated. For example, President Boris Yeltsin 
in the early 1990’s and President Vladimir Putin in the early 2000’s can be both characterized 
with cooperative behaviour. However, both of them were also hostile: with the appointment of 
Yevgeny Primakov, Yeltsin became more “hard liner” with the West and Putin became also more 
assertive around 2004. Thus, Russian foreign policy from the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev 
to the third election of Vladimir Putin can be divided – at least – in five parts. 
The first period dates back before the transition and the appointment of Gorbachev and his 
foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. The term “New Thinking” in foreign policy was 
introduced by Gorbachev which opened the way for the Soviet Union to be renewed in the face 
of the changing global political landscape (Zwick, 1989). Announcing a new paradigm, he did not 
want to accept the Western liberal political and economic system and change completely the 
Soviet Union. Instead, he looked for a new relationship with the West but not at the expense of 
giving up his entire political conviction. After all, Gorbachev was part of the political system of 
the Soviet Union and did not define himself as a liberal Westernizer and did not believe in the 
primacy of liberal democracy. Gorbachev proposed cooperation with the deep-rooted enemies in 
order to create a global unity on the basis of both ideologies, capitalism and socialism. The 
“common European home”, introduced originally by Nikita Khrushchev, was also Gorbachev’s 
main concept to indicate its willingness to bring Russia and the West closer to each other. The 
main purpose of the Russian leadership was to reduce diplomatic tensions and move in the 
direction of a new détente. Furthermore, Gorbachev declared that the notion of imperialism was 
not accurate anymore to criticize the West. Nevertheless, with the continuous decline of the 
Soviet Union, Gorbachev was losing control and the liberals – who criticized him for not being 
decisive in important foreign policy questions – were consolidating around the then President 
Boris Yeltsin (Tsygankov, 2010). 
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The second period was marked with cooperation under the Presidency of Yeltsin and his liberal-
minded minister, Andrei Kozyrev. They believed that the adoption of liberal norms and values 
was the “end of history” which had no alternative. Given that the Soviet Union could not be 
reformed on the basis of socialism, they believed that Moscow had to undertake reforms leading 
to the adoption of Western modes of governance. In the early 1990’s, the weight of geopolitics 
declined and the role of Westernization increased accordingly. The Russian leadership believed 
that Russia was part of the Western civilization and the only reason why Moscow chose the 
wrong path during the Soviet era was that the Bolsheviks had hijacked the identity of the country 
leading to a wrongfully defined vision. The new policy was best characterized by the famous 
security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok (Leichtova, 2014). Whereas Gorbachev saw the 
West which intended to teach the rest of the world, Yeltsin and Kozyrev saw the Western 
civilization with admiration which, in turn, created perfect circumstances for a honeymoon 
period between the “two blocks”. Russia genuinely worked for gaining full membership in 
Western international organizations, most notably in NATO (Tsygankov, 2010). 
The third period can be characterized with more hostility compared to the vision of foreign 
minister Kozyrev. With the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov in 1992, the honeymoon was 
continuously losing momentum. The new foreign minister made absolutely clear that it wanted its 
country to be more influential in the international system. According to Primakov, the West and 
Russia have different interests and he emphasized the need for a multipolar world. Yeltsin also 
changed its tone and declared that Russia was in fact a Eurasian state. In 1995, the President 
claimed that Russia had a vital interest in the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) (Adomeit, 2011). In 1997, the National Security Concept determined Russia as a 
European and an Asian power and sought to have an equal partnership with other great powers. 
The biggest challenge that Russia was facing, according to the new idea, was the expansion of 
NATO. For the purpose of mitigating the declining security outlooks, both sides were agreed to 
sign the document “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
Russia and NATO” which opened the way to Russia for voicing their concerns within the 
organization (Tsygankov, 2010). 
The fourth period was marked again with more cooperation. In the early 2000’s, two major 
events took place. First, Vladimir Putin was elected as President of the Russian Federation. 
Second, the United State of America was attacked in September 2001. This major event triggered 
the turn in Russian foreign policy. Despite for not being a pro-Western liberal, Putin sought to 
promote its relationship with the United States. The main purpose of the new President was to 
frame its interests within the strategic commitments of the West proposing to address the old 
issue of NATO and fight against terrorism. Putin even offered his assistance to support 
operations in Afghanistan. Putin avoided the talks on the eastward expansion of NATO and 
moved closer to Western states to achieve common objectives. However, around 2004, 
circumstances changed: terrorist activities in the northern Caucasus, the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine, the destabilization of central Asia. From Putin’s perspective, the United Stated wanted 
to affect the post-Soviet space stepping up their support, for example, their support to change 
Ukraine. Nevertheless, at that time, Putin did not want to sacrifice its relations with the West 
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over the crisis in Ukraine and issued a statement welcoming any winner in the Ukrainian 
presidential elections (Tsygankov, 2010). 
The fifth period started around 2004 and its implications have far-reaching consequences on 
today’s politics. At first, it was not the return of Primakov’s world but Russia became more and 
more critical over US unilateralism. It also rejected the offer to become a participant of the ENP 
because it did not want to become just a partner of the EU but wanted an equal treatment 
(Adomeit, 2011). At the same time however, Ukraine and Georgia were not only joining the ENP 
but also declared their desire to join NATO which was, from Putin’s perspective, a clear threat to 
Russia. Moscow still wanted to further develop areas of cooperation, however, they suspected 
that the West had geopolitical aims in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, Russian started to voice 
its fears over the developments, however, Putin did not follow the pieces of advice of hard-line 
Statists at this time who recommended to support separatism in Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. 
Nevertheless, in 2007, he voiced his concerns by declaring that NATO “represents a serious 
provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is 
this expansion intended?” Putin even explained to President Bush that “Ukraine is not a real 
state” and added that “if Ukraine does enter NATO, Russia would detach eastern Ukraine (and 
the Crimean Peninsula) and graft them onto Russia” (Blank, 2008). 
In 2008, Dmitri Medvedev was elected as President of Russia. He proposed a new security 
alliance replacing the role of NATO, and on the other hand, blamed the United States for 
creating the global financial crisis. Medvedev confirmed that it would be ready to do anything to 
prevent Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO – in April 2008, for instance, Russia blocked issuing 
those countries Membership Action Plans. President Medvedev stated that Russia had “privileged 
interests in its border regions” (Clover, 2008). Sergei Lavrov, foreign minister of Russia, also 
declared that the Eastern Partnership is an attempt by the EU to expands its “sphere of 
influence” and also stated that Russia had special relations with its neighbours because of 
“hundreds of years of common history” (Pop, 2009). In addition to NATO expansion, the EU 
expansion – mainly the Eastern Partnership – seemed also to be potentially threat to Russia’s 
spheres of influences (Kanet, 2010). 
The term ‘common European neighbourhood’, used under the era of Yeltsin, was rejected and 
instead the term ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russia borders’ became the dominant 
expression. Not only NATO-Russia relations but EU-Russia relations, slowly but gradually, 
become a zero-sum game from Russian perspectives. It also became clear that the 
democratisation efforts by the EU are contrary to the interests of Russia. The instability and the 
frozen conflicts in its neighbourhood was a tool to prevent the EU to make further progress in 
the process of democratisation and the creation of a fully-fledged market economy. The 
dominant position of the Russian elite has become something anti-Western message which 
consists of rejecting the earlier commitments to create a liberal democracy in Russia. In the 
meantime, the continuation of the assertive foreign policy has also dominated the discourse in 
Russia which culminated in the cyber-war against Estonia in 2007, the war in Georgia in 2008 
and now the invasion of Ukraine. One of the main purposes of Russian foreign policy is to re-
establish its regional and global dominance. 
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4. Destroying European optimism 
The refusal of taking into account the changes in Russian foreign policy and – referring back to 
the introduction – the strong belief in an optimist future made it also impossible to foresee what 
was going to happen in Ukraine. In fact, nobody expected in late 2013 that, after months and 
years of preparations, Ukraine would ever refuse to sign the Association Agreement (AA) with 
the EU. Everybody believed that Ukraine was eager to replace the old Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Suddenly, the EU had to face with the harsh reality: it could not 
take for granted that it was the only player in the town and that its incentives – whether 
membership or other financial resources – were capable of changing any neighbouring country’s 
political system. 
Moreover, the refusal of signing the AA was not, of course, the end of the story. After witnessing 
the mass protests in Kiev – which was a kind of “Orange Revolution 2” – and Yanukovich’s 
struggle to save its power as President, Russia decided to annex the Crimean Peninsula and 
destabilize the Eastern parts of Ukraine. Looking behind the intention of Russia is not as easy as 
it may seem. There is an on-going debate on why Russia intervened in Ukraine. John 
Mearsheimer, for example, argues that three critical elements led to the invasion of Ukraine: 
NATO expansion, EU expansion and democracy promotion which he calls the “the West’s triple 
package of policies”. According to Mearsheimer, the main problem has been that the elites in the 
US and Europe have undermined the logic of realism and the realpolitik while they were wedded 
to the idea of liberal order. Mearsheimer’s basic assumption is that great powers are always 
sensitive to potential threats and do not tolerate deploying military forces on their borders 
(Mearsheimer, 2014). 
Michael McFaul, however, argues that Mearsheimer fails to explain why cooperation and 
confrontation both characterized US-Russian relations. The two features, according to McFaul, 
cannot be explained by the expansion of NATO. He claims that the US and Russia would be 
both better off is they pursued the liberal world order. McFual main argument is that “Russian 
foreign policy did not grow more aggressive in response to U.S. policies; it changed as a result of 
Russian internal political dynamics” (McFaul et al., 2014). Putin feared of a colour revolution in 
Russia. Stephen Stefanovich also argues that it was not NATO expansion which caused the 
current crisis and, similarly to McFaul, claims that “Putin’s seizure of Crimea was first and 
foremost an attempt to recover from his own egregious mistakes” (McFaul et al., 2014). 
On the one hand, there is relatively little relevance concerning the question of why Russia 
intervened in Ukraine from the perspective of this study. The only factor which should be 
emphasized is the fact that Russia interfered aggressively in Ukraine no matter why it did. On the 
other hand, it is essential to look at the roots of the problems in order to see the bigger picture. 
Whatever the situation may be, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and then destabilized the 
Eastern parts of Ukraine, the question is: what is the impact of the recent development in 
Ukraine on its democratisation outlook? By invading Ukraine, Russia impedes the 
democratisation of Ukraine in a number of ways. 
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First and foremost, Russia largely weakens the statehood of Ukraine which has far-reaching 
consequence on the ability of the Ukrainian government to implement EU reforms. The reason is 
simple. Two forms of democracy promotion can be distinguished in international politics. The 
top-down approach refers to a method in which the “donor” tries to persuade the political elite 
and leaders to implement the reforms demanded. In other words, the main objective of this 
approach is to induce change at the “upper level” of a state. Incentives, whether its accession 
perspective or other types of financial aids, intend to influence the apparatus and encourage them 
to take all the necessary measures and thus bring about a behavioural change in the target 
country. The bottom-up approach, on the contrary, aims at giving incentives to the civil society 
or organizations, associations or any kind of pro-democratic movement. The main purpose of 
this approach is to induce change at the “lower level” of a state. 
While acknowledging the fact that EU democracy promotion can be characterized by both 
approaches, it is fundamentally based on the top-down approach. By giving various types of 
incentives, the EU aims at achieving its objectives at the “upper level”. In other words, the EU 
aims at persuading the elite of a state to undertake the necessary reforms. However, the 
Ukrainian statehood was called into question by a strong external actor. Therefore, the likelihood 
of the implementation diminishes. A weakened state cannot undertake the reforms as fast and 
effectively as for example those states (e.g. CEECs) which were free from external pressures. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the current government has the power or the ability to implement 
reforms in the whole county. By declaring autonomous regions and independence in the Eastern 
part of the country (whose leaders are supported by Russia), it is obvious that the reforms cannot 
reach the same level of satisfaction, at least not from EU perspectives. The lack of power over 
the whole county results in the inability to implement reforms in certain areas. 
Second, it should not be forgotten that despite all the difficulties Ukrainians have, the AA has 
been already signed between the EU and its member states, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the 
other part. The agreement truly represents one of the most effective ways for political and 
economic transformation. However, the AA cannot be applied throughout Ukraine because, 
similarly to other reforms, the state is not strong enough to implement it throughout the country. 
Nevertheless, it is no coincidence that the possible signature of the AA partly explains the current 
crisis. In fact, the Eastern Partnership and its economic and political offers (AA/DCFTA) 
constitutes a zero sum game: having a free trade agreement with the EU while being in a customs 
union with the Eurasian Union are mutually exclusive. Of course, Ukraine can have free trade 
agreements with Russia but the AA makes it impossible to join the customs union with Russia 
since this latter scenario would mean the introduction of a common trade barrier vis-à-vis others. 
In addition, the AA is also considered the a backdoor for NATO expansion as it declares that it 
promotes “gradual convergence on foreign and security matters with the aim of Ukraine’s ever-
deeper involvement in the European security area” and seeks to “deepen political association and 
increase political and security policy convergence and effectiveness” (European Union, 2014). 
Third, Russia also hampers the path of European integration by questioning the borders of 
Ukraine. Since stable and secure borders are a quintessential element of the accession, it is clear 
that Ukraine cannot guarantee one of the fundamental requirements of the EU (nor NATO’s). It 
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is also evident that Ukraine was not given membership perspective and can be argued that it must 
not fulfil all the requirements. While this may be true, the wish of building closer ties with 
Europe clearly slows down because of the fact that Ukraine is not capable for defending its 
borders. 
Fourth, strongly connected with the above mentioned factors is the existence of regional conflict 
which is also an obstacle to join Euro-Atlantic international organizations, such as NATO or the 
EU. Ukraine is not only in a regional conflict but is part of a deep and global political crisis. 
Today it is not clear how the crisis will end since multiple scenarios can happen. It is less likely 
that Ukraine as a whole country could move forward in the European path given its current 
status. Today it is less likely that Ukraine can continue its road towards the EU in its “pre-2013 
form”. 
It must be emphasized that even if realist arguments may better explain the behaviour of certain 
states, they certainly cannot excuse their tactics. Realism may serve to put the actions into context 
in order to better understand a few events of world politics but may not serve for justification. 
Nevertheless, it is important to draw the lessons: whatever theoretical framework may better 
explain Russian behaviour, peace and prosperity cannot be taken for granted in Europe, as the 
case of Ukraine clearly shows the evidence. 
5. Conclusion 
The ENP was initially planned to achieve its objectives in a more friendly and cooperative 
international political atmosphere. From the very beginning, it has always suffered from several 
problems (e.g. lack of membership perspective) but Russia’s intervention in Ukraine became the 
newest challenge of the policy. The democratisation process is not only slowing down because of 
the well-known problems of the policy or Ukraine’s interdependence on Russia but also because 
of the consequences of intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. By weakening the statehood, 
Ukraine simply cannot undertake the necessary reforms nor can it move – as a whole country – 
forward European integration. 
Given the new international situation in Europe, the ENP has to be more realistic concerning its 
approach to Ukraine. The EU has already started to reassert its role in its neighbourhood. The 
new review on the ENP does not use anymore the idealistic buzzword of ‘ring of friends’. 
Instead, the main political priority has become the stabilisation of the neighbouring countries 
(European Commission, 2015). Replacing the 2003 European Security Strategy, the new EU 
Global Strategy will no longer consider Russia as a “strategic partner” but will treat it as a 
“strategic challenge” (Gotev, 2016). More recently, Donald Tusk said that it is a utopia that 
Europe can impose its values on the external world (Zalan, 2016). It seems that the EU 
understands the changes in international politics.  
The ENP can be called a “friendly policy” which means that it is able to induce changes provided 
that the neighbourhood is more or less peaceful and there is no third party which would use its 
hard power to prevent the objectives of the ENP. However, economic and political integration 
immediately slows down if a strong third actor intervenes in this process. Russia can be certainly 
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considered as such actor whose main aim is to prevent Ukraine – as a whole country – joining the 
EU and NATO. It may be possible that Ukraine may continue its path towards European 
integration, as the signed AA shows, and may further develop its democratic institutions but its 
decision may have the price of leaving behind some of its territories in the “grey zone” of 
Europe. 
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